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“The reasons for the success of German monetary policy in defending price stability are in part
historical. The experience gained twice with hyperinflation in the first half of this century has
helped to develop a special sensitivity to inflation and has caused the wider public to believe in the
critical importance of monetary stability in Germany. For this reason, the strong position of the
Bundesbank is widely accepted by the general public - questioning its independence even seems to
be a national taboo. This social consensus has yielded strong support for the policy of the
Bundesbank. … No government has ever seriously considered modifying the Bundesbank Act as a
means to deal with cases of conflict, although it could have done so with a simple majority of the
Parliament. Historical experience in Germany testifies to the success of the concept of an
independent central bank. Inflation rates have remained far below the average rates of most other
industrial countries. Stable prices have contributed to a fairly stable social climate, which is felt to
have favored growth of the German economy; this has strengthened its role in the world economy.
The German currency, the Deutsche Mark, has become a major reserve currency in the world and
the “anchor currency” in the European Monetary System, and it enjoys a high standing. ... In the
light of the success of the Bundesbank, it is only natural that the German public will expect that
any successor, which could take its place at the European level, should be at least as well equipped
as the Bundesbank to defend price stability” (Hans Tietmeyer 1991: 182-3; Bundesbank president
1993-9).
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1.  INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the (re-)establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945
and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on
the “independence” of the central bank, which, together with a so-called “stability-
orientation” in monetary policy, proved a lasting German peculiarity. The paper inquires
whether contemporary German economic thought may have provided a theoretical case for
this tradition and scrutinizes the political calculus that motivated some key actors in the play.
Contrary to a widespread presumption, Ordoliberalism—the dominant contemporary
force within the German economics profession widely held to have shaped the new economic
order of West Germany called “Soziale Marktwirtschaft” (social market economy)—is found
to have had no such impact on the country’s emerging monetary order at all. In fact,
important contradictions between the postulate of central bank independence [CBI] and some
key ideas underlying Ordoliberalism will be identified. Nor can an alternative (more
Keynesian) policy regime and its model of CBI that was developed in the mid 1950s by the
Economic Advisory Council of Ludwig Erhard, West Germany’s famous first economics
minister, claim any credit for the eventual legal status of the central bank that became
enshrined in the Bundesbank Act of 1957; that policy regime subsequently remained
untouched despite the (Keynesian) Stability and Growth Act [SGA] of 1967.
Section 2 revisits the Allies’ role in re-erecting a central banking system in West
Germany in 1946-8. Section 3 reviews the conflicting views of central bankers and the
Adenauer government on the issue of their relationship and cooperation in economic policy,
while section 4 identifies the “Übergangsgesetz” (interim law) of 1951 as the starting point of
the German CBI tradition. Section 5 then investigates whether the postulate of CBI may have
any theoretical foundation in Ordoliberalism, whereas section 6 reviews the Keynesian model
of CBI designed by Erhard’s Economic Advisory Council in the mid 1950s. Economics
minister Ludwig Erhard’s role as ordoliberal and CBI proponent is the subject of section 7,
before the Keynesian economics minister Karl Schiller’s part in Germany’s CBI tradition and
in relation to the SGA of 1967 will be discussed in section 8. Section 9 concludes.2
2. CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE DUE TO ALLIED OPPRESSION?
The Bank deutscher Länder [BdL], established on March 1, 1948, and forerunner of the
Deutsche Bundesbank erected in 1957, is generally seen as a compromise between
conflicting British and American ideas in this area.
1 Contrary to the Potsdam Agreement of
August 1945, which required the Allies to treat the four occupation zones as a single
economic unit, developments between the financial sectors of the three western zones quickly
became rather diverse.
2 Guided by the Bank of England’s centralized organizational
structure, British occupation policy focused on conserving what was left of the old
Reichsbank including its centralized structures. As early as November 1945, the
Reichsbankleitstelle, Hauptverwaltung der Reichsbank in Hamburg took up functions for the
whole of the British zone. Plans originating from within the Reichsbank for re-centralizing
German central banking and finance in Hamburg (after the loss of the Berlin Headquarter)
were welcomed by the British. Traditionally good relations between the Bank of England and
the Reichsbank had survived the war. There was also the more pragmatic interest in coping
with mounting occupational costs and not destroying what might still be intact or easily
repairable.
American thinking ran along different lines though. To secure a permanent weakening
of defeated totalitarian Germany, decentralization represented the United States’ key policy
maxim. The old centralized Reichsbank was considered part of the Nazi regime. In view of
the decentralized structure of the Federal Reserve Bank System, too, it must have seemed
natural to re-draw Germany’s central banking landscape along home-model lines. While a
corresponding plan (due to Joseph M. Dodge) was rejected by the Allied Control Council (the
quadripartite body governing Germany) in Berlin to be put in place in all four zones, the
Americans pushed through their ideas and established Landeszentralbanken ([LZBs] central
banks at the Länder level) in their zone at the start of 1947 (Häuser 1998).
Whereas the French quickly followed suit and established LZBs in their zone in
February 1947 too, the British only did so in March 1948, reluctantly and after attaining the
American concession to establish the BdL. Initially erected as central bank for the newly
                                                            
1 See Adler 1949, Loehr 1952, Wandel 1980, Horstmann 1989, 1990, 1991, Dickhaus 1997, Buchheim 1998,
Holtfrerich and Iwami 1999, and Distel 2003, for instance.
2Abrupt change occurred early on in the Soviet occupation zone, but will be excluded from the analysis here.3
formed “Bizone” (the jointly governed U.S. and British zones), it was joined by the French
LZBs just before the currency reform of 20 June 1948 (retroactively to 25 March 1948).
Earlier American planning had foreseen a central control and coordinating board for
the LZBs, particularly Dodge’s plan for a Länder-Union-Bank of April 1946. The British
successfully pressed for a proper bank rather than a board, and one that was to also include a
board of managers ([BM]; Direktorium) at the system’s centre in addition to its central bank
council ([CBC]; Zentralbankrat) representing the heads of the LZBs. As it turned out, with
Wilhelm Vocke as president of the BM, the British idea of a powerful centre for the
decentralized central banking system soon became reality. Vocke, who had a Reichsbank
background and Bank of England backing too, not only became the dominant figure at the
BdL, but also a key force behind the newly founded central bank’s push for independence. In
his memoirs, Vocke (1973) described the Bank of England’s long-time governor Montagu
Norman with exuberant adoration, praising him as the Treasury’s antagonist and decrying the
Old Lady’s fateful subordination to HM Treasury.
As the Allies’ imposed BdL law of 1948 explicitly stated that the bank would not be
subject to instructions from German political authorities, it might at first appear as if foreign
oppression was wholly responsible for starting the tradition of CBI in Germany (cf.
Buchheim 1998, 2001). While seemingly a sharp break with former Reichsbank traditions of
ultimate political control exercised by the Reichskanzler, since the Deutsche Reich respected
the gold standard—the Reich had gone on to gold in 1871 with the Reichsbank being
established five years later to safeguard the gold currency—in truth neither the Chancellor
nor the bank was properly in charge of an independent monetary policy though (Holtfrerich
1988, James 1998).
3 A real contrast was that while in the old days any decision to go off
                                                            
3 It is of some interest in this context that although the Reichsbank became legally independent from German
(albeit not from Allied) political control with the Autonomy law of 26 May 1922 (confirmed in the Banking
Law of 30 August 1924), this did not prevent the bank from committing catastrophic blunders: first the
hyperinflation in 1923, then the banking crises and deflation in the early 1930s, followed by the Nazi era. In this
light, it would seem fair to say that Germany’s previous experience with CBI was exceptionally poor (Giersch
and Lehment 1981). Apart from elegantly rewriting German history—turning the rather real consequences of
Hitler’s “Totaler Krieg” into an apparently purely monetary phenomenon— the bank’s symmetry of failure
conspicuously contradicts what is habitually described by modern Bundesbankers as the historical background
to their post-WWII success. (Hans Tietmeyer sums it up nicely in the quotation at the start.) Johnson (1998:
199) refers to the Bundesbank’s “orchestrated efforts to reinsert memories of the hyperinflation of the 1920s
into Germany’s postwar political mythology,” but he may well underestimate their lasting impact on public
opinion when judging that “the myth of the ‘lessons of hyperinflation’ has always been rivaled by another
memory that found a broad reception in the late 1960s—the role of the independent Reichsbank in triggering
and aggravating the Great Depression. While the hyperinflation of 1923 certainly contributed to Weimar
Germany’s social ferment, it cannot be overlooked, as the Bundesbank is now inclined to do, that the active4
gold, for instance, rested with the Reich’s political authorities, no central German political
authority that could have given instructions to the bank existed at the time when the BdL was
established anyway.
Without any central German government or parliament in place at the time when the
BdL took on its role as the first tri-zone institution in the context of the currency reform of 20
June 1948, whatever political influence in monetary matters there was on the German side, it
resided with the Länder. While not in a position to give instructions to their LZBs either, the
Länder governments’ control powers rested mainly in their right to appoint and dismiss the
LZBs’ top personnel. Given that the LZBs’ heads made up the BdL’s CBC, the Länder had
some political power over the BdL too, albeit exercised in a decentralized fashion; an aspect
CBI proponents later on came to stress. This situation was a result of the federal structure of
the emerging West Germany, which was a product of the Allied policy of decentralization.
Off with a head start, the BdL was put in a rather strong position when Germany’s first
federal government later entered the play—faced with the vested interest of the Länder too.
In view of both the Zeitgeist (cf. Kisch and Elkin 1930, Einzig 1935, Kriz 1948) as
well as their respective home situation it nevertheless seems puzzling that the Allies
explicitly stated the BdL’s independence from German political control in the first place.
With the New Deal and war-related rise in the United States’ public debt ratio the Federal
Reserve System came under close guidance from the Treasury until the 1951 Accord (Sylla
1988). Similarly, close Treasury-Bank of England cooperation had emerged after September
1931, which became no less important with the war-related leap in Britain’s public debt ratio.
The Old Lady was nationalized and the Treasury granted the right to give directions to the
bank in 1946 (Cairncross 1988, Fjorde 1992). The French government exercised rather direct
control over the Banque de France since the 1936 law and nationalized the bank in 1945 too
(Bovier 1988). In addition, the German Länder authorities pushed hard for more influence
over the LZBs and BdL (Adler 1949, Möller 1976, Horstmann 1990, Bundesbank 1998).
Why should the Allies have wished to equip Germany with, what is today widely considered
a public good, CBI?
The point is that the BdL was not independent at all. It was under all-comprehensive
Allied control. For Article II of Law no. 60 of the American military government (BdL Law)
stated that: “In determining the polices of the Bank, the Board of Directors shall be subject to
                                                                                                                                                                                            
complicity of Hjalmar Schacht and the independent Reichsbank in the Great Depression helped bring Hitler to
power” (Johnson 1998: 24).5
such directions as may be issued by the Allied Bank Commission.” In line with what the
1946 Dodge plan had earlier on foreseen for the Länder-Union-Bank, an Allied Bank
Commission [ABC] was established together with the BdL (and residing with it under the
same roof) in order to exercise Allied, rather than German, control over the bank.
4
And, at least initially, the ABC took a hands-on approach to supervising the BdL,
including top personnel matters, policy determination and implementation as well as financial
supervision issues. The BdL was not only highly aware of this, but strongly disliked its
dependence. Interestingly, in pushing its own cause and policies, the bank did not shy away
from conflicts with the ABC. Perhaps to test how far it could go, especially in the initial
phase “the BdL tried often to dissent, pursuing policy contrary to the Allies” (Dickhaus 1997:
301).
Later on supervisor and supervisee came to like their relationship much better and
even tried to conserve it as political developments were pointing towards change. Inevitably,
a significant change occurred in September 1949 when the Military Governments’ powers
were passed on to the Allied High Commission [AHC] in the context of the
“Besatzungsstatut.” While continuing to reside with the BdL, from then on the ABC was
merely reporting to the AHC’s Finance Committee [FC], which took over responsibility
(Lindenlaub 1992). The FC found itself in an uncomfortable position though. On the one
hand, the FC seems to have had no inclination to exercise hands-on supervision; probably
because it felt that its days were numbered anyway as Germany was soon to take over
matters. On the other hand, it nevertheless remained responsible until that was actually going
to happen. Thus, the FC actively encouraged the new German government to pursue change
in this sphere.
It is of some interest that the AHC did not consider it appropriate to simply withdraw
its powers over the BdL, which would have left a corresponding vacuum of political control.
Rather, it pressed the German government to establish a substitute arrangement before it
thought it could do so. In fact, right from the beginning the Allies seemed conscious about
creating nothing more than an interim arrangement. There was no intention to pre-empt a
German decision and force CBI upon the country. Deciding that matter was merely
                                                            
4 The agreement on establishing the ABC of 16 February 1948 reads: “for the purpose of exercising general
supervision over the policies of the Bank Deutscher Länder to the end that the objectives of U.S. Military
Government Law No. 60 and British Military Government Ordinance No. 129 establishing the Bank shall be
carried out” (Historical Archive, Deutsche Bundesbank [in the following: Buba HA], file 610). Cf. Distel 2003.6
postponed. Understandably, though, the Allies felt no inclination to deal with a central bank
that was independent of their own control as long as they were still in charge.
This is not to say the Allies had no impact on subsequent developments at all, the fact
that the BdL ended up in a position of far-reaching independence within the newly founded
West German federal republic in particular. But their contribution was more indirect in
nature. Not because of its supposed independence, but as a by-product of the Allied policy of
decentralization and federalization of Germany the BdL was put in a rather strong starting
position. For when Germany’s first federal government entered the play it was facing both
the vested interest of the Länder (Könneker 1957, Goodman 1992) as well as a central bank
that had enjoyed a head start in matters of reputation building.
3. CONFLICTING VIEWS OF THE ADENAUER GOVERNMENT AND THE BdL
Article 88 of West Germany’s Grundgesetz (preliminary constitution) of 23 May 1949
ordered the federal government to “establish a central bank and bank of issue as a Federal
Bank [Bundesbank].”  In August 1949 at the latest, serious internal discussions started at the
BdL to prepare for that event. There was some disagreement within the bank on the extent to
which the decentralized structure of the system should be conserved and the BdL, as erected
by the Allies, simply become the Bundesbank—a solution that was favored by the Länder
and a majority of central bankers. Another position preferred a more centralized institutional
solution though. On this issue, as on others, tensions were present from early on between
Wilhelm Vocke, president of the bank’s BM, and Karl Bernard, president of its CBC, as a
kind of rivalry between the bank’s two governing bodies and leaders had quickly emerged.
As far as securing the bank’s independence was concerned, however, central bankers seemed
united in pursuing their institutional-political interests with utmost determination.
The BdL championed an arrangement which foresaw that the election of its two
presidents would require confirmation by the Bundespräsident (Head of State) and that a
standing committee, consisting of the Bundeskanzler, the economics and finance ministers,
and the bank’s two presidents, should be formed. The committee’s foreseen role was to
regularly discuss all principle matters in economic policy and credit policy “in trusting
collaboration.”
5 On the one hand, the BdL’s favored “minimal solution” shows that the bank
                                                            
5 Note of 29 September 1949 of a BdL working group on the Bundesbank question (Buba HA, file 358). In his
letter to Adenauer of 31 October 1949 Vocke made a similar proposal (Buba HA, file 2011).7
was not under the illusion that it might retain its position of complete independence from
federal German political control. On the other hand, the bank was clearly pushing for an
extreme form of independence—compared to contemporary arrangements elsewhere and
against international currents prevailing at the time.
Unsurprisingly, the federal government had different ideas, although lacking general
agreement on both the issue of organizational structure and the exact way in which its
relationship with the bank should be structured. Allegedly, Ludwig Erhard, Germany’s first
economics minister and famous originator of the “economic miracle,” was a champion of
CBI, an issue to be further investigated in section 7 below. Following Anglo-Saxon
traditions, but against German ones, it was finance minister Fritz Schäffer though who was
responsible for drafting the new Bundesbank Act. And this was just one among several issues
that shaped the rivalry between the two ministers for years to come, with Erhard advocating a
centralized re-organization and Schäffer laboring to largely conserve the Allies’ decentralized
model.
As Schäffer saw it, CBI might well serve its purpose, occasionally, namely as his
shield against parliamentary spending demands. But Schäffer’s overreaching guiding
principle in this matter was that the government’s responsibility for a unified economic
policy was indivisible and that the central bank must not be in a position to topple the
government. He could be sure of Chancellor Adenauer’s full support for this conviction.
Interestingly, initially, there was quite some support at the Länder level too for
securing the federal government’s influence over the bank. For instance, at a conference of
finance ministers in Königstein in December 1949 a proposal was drawn up for the control of
monetary policy through a ministerial economic policy council of the federal government.
While not giving any specific instructions to the central bank, the Council would develop
guidelines to be followed by the bank. Designed to combine an elastic monetary policy with
sufficient protection of the currency, the bank was foreseen as enjoying a veto right in case of
either consumer price increases or rises in unemployment in excess of certain upper
thresholds (seen as signalling inflation or deflation risks respectively). Similar thinking still
prevailed by mid 1950 in the relevant committees dealing with the issue for the Bundesrat
(the upper chamber of parliament representing the Länder). This was partly a reflection of
Länder frustration with their own lack of influence over BdL policy in 1948-9, a situation the
Länder felt was unacceptable given that they had to bear responsibility for the outcomes.
They were also annoyed by BdL attempts to push back further any Länder influence over8
their respective LZB and the BdL. But these sympathetic feelings were soon to be
overshadowed by the emerging rivalry between the Länder and federal governments, sparked
off by issues like the distribution of central bank profits, for instance.
The earliest plans at Schäffer’s finance ministry were drawn up along old Reichsbank
lines, with a Kuratorium (headed by the Bundeskanzler and under the federal government’s
majority control) determining guidelines for monetary policy to be followed by the bank. But
the first expert draft (of 10 February 1950; Buba HA 358) to be submitted to the BdL for
discussion explored a new approach, specifying the bank’s goal as that of “safeguarding the
currency under consideration of economic necessities.” Government representatives could
attend CBC meetings enjoying veto powers. The Bundespräsident would appoint and might
dismiss (for important reasons) the BdL’s two presidents. In addition, he would appoint the
chairman of a new “Appellationsinstanz,” which would rule in cases of conflict (i.e.,
government veto). This special federal arbitration body would include five delegates from the
BdL and federal government each, with its chairman enjoying the casting vote in case of a tie.
Lacking any sympathy with Schäffers’ draft, the BdL reciprocated with an own draft.
It accepted the formulation of the policy goal, grudgingly (handwritten comments on the draft
read: “the primary goal of the bank is to safeguard the currency”), but the bank demanded a
hearing prior to any dismissal. Its main criticism was directed at the Appellationsinstanz
though, which the bank argued would dismantle its independence and thereby undermine
trust in the currency. The bank pointed out correctly that Schäffer’s draft would make
monetary policy decisions and responsibilities very opaque. As an alternative the BdL
proposed a second round of voting by the CBC in case of government veto.
In essence, this earliest batch of proposals reflected conflicting views on the issue of
who should have the final word in economic policy determination and what this would
require from the BdL in terms of cooperation with the government. On the one hand, the BdL
accepted that, in principle, it was the government’s right to lay down the relevant goals of
economic policy. On the other hand, the BdL held that this right should reach only so far as
the bank judged that aligning its monetary policy with the government’s economic policy
might be possible at any juncture. Essentially, it would thus be at the bank’s discretion to
declare the limits of acceptable cooperation, opening up the possibility of bank opposition or
even outright dominance. Having its discretion overruled by some “referee” (under
government control) was unacceptable, from the BdL’s viewpoint.9
It was equally unacceptable to Schäffer that the bank should be in a position to oppose
the government. As the latter bears ultimate responsibility for policy outcomes, in his view, it
must also have the final word. Schäffer strongly held that the government must not allow “its
economic policy being dictated by the CBC,” which was exactly the way Adenauer felt about
the matter too.
6 In fact, a new draft from the finance ministry of 5 September 1950 put the
Chancellor himself in the position of chairman of the Appellationsinstanz. While the bank’s
goal was now to “safeguard the currency,” in fulfilling its functions the bank would have to
consider the government’s general economic policy, with the guidelines for currency and
credit policy being determined by the bank and the government conjointly.
Clearly, the bank and government’s respective positions were incompatible. It is
noteworthy that Schäffer’s position was much akin to arguments put forward by no other than
Milton Friedman (1962), emphasizing democratic control and the unity of responsibility for
economic policy. In his fierce critique of CBI, Friedman rejected the concept for both
political as well as economic reasons. By contrast, for those who hold that certain aspects of
monetary policy require technical expertise and should be free from any direct political
interference, the trouble with this earliest confrontation of views is that it is never made all
that clear as to which policy aspects those “guidelines” or “instructions” might actually refer
in practice. In modern terminology, it is not clear whether the government would determine
the goals of policy (and the bank be merely instrument independent but goal dependent), or
whether the government might instruct the bank on the instrument setting (i.e. policy stance)
too.
From occurrences in 1950 it might appear that what Adenauer really had in mind was
that he should have the final word on the rate of interest. Interestingly enough, though, early
confrontations in 1950 seem to have provoked calls in favor of the BdL’s independence in the
media and impacted on public opinion in the same way (cf. Dickhaus 1997: 309-10, fn 87).
Of course both Adenauer and Schäffer would claim in public that they were in favor of CBI
and did not want the bank to be dependent on their instructions.
4. THE END OF ALLIED CONTROL AND THE “ÜBERGANGSGESETZ”
(INTERIM LAW) OF 1951
                                                            
6Adenauer wrote to Schäffer on 26 July 1950: “In summary, we need to find a solution which provides the
government with the option to give instructions to the central bank in case the bank refuses to undertake a10
In the autumn of 1950, the situation was thus in a deadlock. There was some broad agreement
within the government (and the coalition parties that formed it) that the Bundesbank should
be neither completely independent nor directly dependent on instructions. But great confusion
prevailed as to what form of independence might establish the right balance and secure the
desired kind of political control in practice. As explicitly focusing on the bank’s policy remit
and bank-government cooperation had proved complicated, attention shifted more and more
toward the appointment issue. Clearly, attempts to secure government influence on monetary
policy via personal relationships rather than policy remit provide a far less transparent route.
As another complication, this route set the vested interests of the Länder governments clearly
against the federal government’s ambitions.
At the start, the heads of the LZBs forming the BdL’s CBC were all appointed by the
Länder governments, while the CBC itself elected the BdL’s two presidents as well as the
remaining MB members; with all this taking place under Allied Control. The federal
government, non-existent when the LZBs and BdL were established, started out from a zero
share of political influence in the appointment process and over monetary policy generally.
While the Länder and federal governments had a shared interest in pushing back central
bankers’ role in the appointment process, the tricky issue was to carve out the new balance of
power between themselves. This applied to the issue of whether the federal government
should gain any say on the matter of the LZB representatives on the CBC. And it applied to
the question whether appointing the MB should be under the federal government’s control
alone. Finally, there was the issue of balance in representation on the CBC, where LZB
representatives by far outnumbered MB members.
Particularly, as one fraction of the federal government led by Ludwig Erhard was
seeking a full re-organization of the central banking system towards a more centralized
solution, the Länder governments were highly alert that the federal government’s gain in
control should not decisively reduce their own powers. These concerns were not eased by
attempts to completely sidestep the Bundesrat by arguing that the Grundgesetz ordered the
federal government to establish a “federal bank” and thus excluded any role for the Länder in
this matter anyway (a controversy that ended up before the constitutional court).
While the body politic was thus caught up in power fights among itself, the BdL was
pleased with its de facto status of far-reaching independence from both German and Allied
                                                                                                                                                                                            
measure that is required to support the implementation of government policy” (Bundesarchiv Koblenz [in the
following: BA], file 102/5706; my translation).11
political control that had emerged after September 1949 and in no hurry to see any change to
it. The bank was quite annoyed when the Federal government, without its prior consultation,
promptly raised the issue of adapting the BdL’s statutes with the AHC in the autumn of 1949.
In the end, however, the decisive stimulus to reform the BdL’s position actually came from
the Allies’ side. In the context of the revision of the statute of Germany’s occupation of 6
March 1951, the AHC sent a letter to Chancellor Adenauer asking him to bring about the
conditions for German control over the BdL that would allow the Allies to give up theirs:
“The Allied High Commission appreciates that these responsibilities could not,
without serious inconvenience, be given up so long as no legislation has been enacted
establishing a competent Federal authority to assume them” (letter of 6 March 1951;
reprinted in: Bundesbank (1988: 101).
Not the request for change as such, but its timing surprised the government.
Discussions between the two sides had been going on for some time, and they had influenced
the tactics used by Schäffer and Adenauer in negotiating the Bundesbank Act. At the cabinet
meeting of 6 December 1950 Schäffer informed his colleagues that the Bundesbank question
was becoming an urgent matter as the ABC was about to be dissolved. But then the issue
dragged on, the expected letter from the AHC was delayed, so that on 23 February 1951
Schäffer had just submitted to the cabinet a new draft of the Bundesbank Act —when the
AHC letter finally did arrive on 6 March 1951.
Subsequent developments led Hentschel (1988) to conclude that Schäffer saw the
Allies’ prompting as a welcome opportunity to take both the cabinet and the BdL by surprise.
Schäffer informed the cabinet about the AHC’s initiative at its meeting on 20 March, arguing
that the new situation required either immediate agreement on the Bundesbank Act or the
creation of some interim arrangement. The cabinet unanimously decided at that meeting that
“a draft of an interim law has to be produced soon, which would, in principle, foresee the
federal government to take the place of the ABC. The presidents of the CBC and the MB
should be called in to the discussion of this draft” (Cabinet Minutes 1951: 259-60; my
translation). Schäffer asked to put this on the agenda for the cabinet meeting on 30 March.
Apparently, the BdL only learned about the cabinet’s decision on March 26 or 27. A
CBC meeting on March 29 rejected the plan, vigorously asking the government to pursue no
more than the repeal of the Allies’ control authority. Note that the conflicting positions had
thus moved to their extremes. Schäffer’s idea to have the government step in in the ABC’s
place would have provided the government with an all-encompassing grip on the BdL, even12
if “transitorily” only. Equally radical, on the BdL’s proposal, the bank would have secured a
de jure status of complete independence; which the BdL argued ironically enough, would
bring no practical change to the status quo as the ABC had not been using its authority for
quite some time. As a compromise, the BdL suggested to add stipulations that would oblige
the bank to take the government’s general economic policy into account, while changes to its
statutes would require confirmation by the government too.
The BdL’s compromise formula formed the basis for subsequent negotiations between
the government and the bank in early April. At the final stage of these negotiations Adenauer
intervened in order to strengthen the bank’s obligation to “support in adequate ways” the
government’s policy. The draft law submitted to the upper chamber of parliament on 2 May
1951 reads: “The BdL is obliged to take the government’s general economic policy into
account and to support it in the context of its tasks” (my translation). Passing the upper
chamber of parliament, this formula was also accepted by the relevant “Committee for
Money and Credit” of the lower chamber, which expressed reluctance to add too much detail
to the interim arrangement for fear that this might prejudice the final law. The committee’s
lead member from the Social Democratic Party, Walter Seuffert, expressed concern about the
lack of any stipulations in case of conflict, a concern that was shared by the committee’s
chairman Hugo Scharnberg from the Christian Democratic Party. In the end, the only details
added concerned the government’s participation rights in CBC meetings and its right to defer
the CBC’s decision-taking for a maximum of eight days.
As it turned out, the hurriedly negotiated “Übergangsgesetz” (interim law) that came
into effect on 10 August 1951 prejudiced the final law—which was going to take another six
years of negotiations—in all its essentials. The law of 1951 properly established the German
tradition of CBI, featuring a vaguely defined remit for the bank together with its obligation to
support the government’s general economic policy; albeit leaving it at the bank’s discretion
to determine the point at which it might more or less openly oppose the government.
All avenues along which Schäffer had previously tried in his various drafts to make
sure that the government would safely have the upper hand in dealing with the bank had
become blocked. In line with Vocke’s vision, the bank had secured a position as the
government’s antagonist. Thus, from then on the government was forced even more to focus
on whatever leverage it might gain on the appointment of the bank’s leadership. In this area,
however, the federal government’s ambitions conflicted with the vested interests of the
Länder. In this political game of gaining influence and erecting barriers against others’13
influences, there was only one proper winner: central bankers. Of course the BdL was in no
hurry to see any final law get passed that might have weakened what it had attained.
Particularly, as the interim law offered it a welcome chance, building on its head start in
1948, to further nourish its own public prestige; perhaps even at the government’s expense.
5. INFLUENCE OF ORDOLIBERAL IDEAS: IS CBI REALLY COMPATIBLE
WITH ORDOLIBERALISM?
According to Abelshauser (1991), Germany embarked on a special path in 1948 as far as its
“Ordnungspolitik” was concerned, i.e. policies aimed at organizing a market economy and
regulating its order of market competition. While aspiring to overcome traditional liberal
views on economic order, the country did not join in the international triumph of Keynesian
demand management either. The economic instabilities of the 1920s and the Great
Depression were seen as a failure of laissez faire, or lack of government intervention of the
right kind, namely, in organizing and regulating its market order. Early practical experiences
with Keynesian policies in overcoming the Great Depression in 1932-3, if anything, helped to
discredit Keynesianism. The perception was that these “full employment policies”—
seemingly inevitably—evolved into the full-blown command economy of the subsequent
Nazi era.
7
For instance, Alfred Müller-Armack (1947), a leading ordoliberal and high-rank
official in Ludwig Erhard’s economics ministry, called for a synthesis between the market
and the state that required the state to relinquish any form of control that is in contradiction to
the market economy and employ only those that are “marktkonform” (in agreement with the
market order): “A synthesis is only possible with a form of control which, both in its totality
and in each individual measure, focuses on sustaining, if not improving the market economy”
(Müller-Armack 1947: 90; my translation).
What might this principle imply with respect to monetary policy? In particular, how
does CBI fit into the ordoliberal view of a sound economic order? Providing a good starting
point, Walter Eucken (1952), figurehead of Ordoliberalism and leader of the “Freiburg
School,” stated the following principles of government policy. First, policy should focus on
                                                            
7 A conspicuously strong disdain for any Keynesian thought is common among ordoliberals. Peacock (1993: 6-
7) reports of “a curious incident during a seminar at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau, where Walter
Eucken, the famous German liberal, had established his Euckenkreis.” He relates the “emotional reactions” to
the preface of the German edition of The General Theory and the fact that many ordoliberals suffered Nazi
persecution.14
dissolving economic power groups or constrain their operation. Second, policy should be
limited to moulding the forms of the economic order, but not include control of economic
processes. While the first principle directs policy toward dissolving concentration of
economic power within the financial system, the second orders the state to set up a monetary
order which does not involve ongoing state intervention in the economic process itself.
As a matter of principle, any government intervention in economic processes within
the currency sphere would thus be ruled out. Or, could there be any exceptions to this rule?
One relevant idea, due to Alexander Rüstow (1932), is that “liberal interventions” may be
acceptable, namely those which do not affect the free determination of price. Another, due to
Wilhelm Röpke (1942, 1950), is akin to Müller-Armack’s notion of “marktkonform”:
interventions, on this count, are “liberal” as opposed to dirigiste, if they do not abolish the
price mechanism and self-control of markets, but become merely assimilated in it as new
data.
These qualifications do not change our verdict at all: interest rate policies, as currently
practiced by central banks all over the world, are nothing else but ongoing interventions in
market processes. Obviously, the determination of interest rates is not being left to the self-
control of markets. No matter whether carried out by independent or dependent central
bankers, interest rate policies do not qualify as “Ordnungspolitik.” The Economist (1999)
quite properly referred to the peculiar role of central bankers in today’s world of market
enthusiasm and liberalization as that of “central planners.” These planners may set interest
rates either wisely or poorly, but cannot transform their doings into “Ordnungspolitik.”
8
The quest is thus on for designing a monetary order in which the determination of
interest rates would be left to the self-control of markets. It is of some interest here that
Milton Friedman fiercely rejected any idea that central banks should try to pursue money
supply “targeting” through orthodox interest rate policy. Pushing for his famous “k-percent
rule,” Friedman (1960, 1968) put much emphasis on implementation through direct money-
base control. This was intended to reduce central bankers’ degree of discretion literally to
zero and prevent them from manipulating interest rates. Friedman’s (1962) strong opposition
                                                            
8 Clearly, neither rule-based nor non-activist interest rate policies are any more “Ordnungspolitik” than any
other type. Furthermore, attributing wisdom to keeping interest rates forever stable in a changing world is not
only absurd from a Wicksellian-Keynesian monetary-theoretic viewpoint. Eucken’s principle of “constancy of
economic policy,” too, cannot rationalize a “steady hand” interest rate policy, since blocking market adjustments
through interventions in the market process makes nonsense of ordoliberal wisdom altogether.15
to CBI was noted above. His favored monetary regime was designed as an autopilot system
that would leave interest rate determination to the market process alone.
Did Walter Eucken and his Freiburg School devise practical proposals to implement
their grand idea of “Ordnungspolitik” in the currency sphere that were equally consistent? In
his Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie, Eucken (1940) rejected the traditional focus of
monetary theory on the determination of the value of money as insufficient. Instead, theory
should endeavor to explain how the economic process is conditioned by monetary factors. In
his view, the role of money is far-reaching and lasting, as economic order and monetary order
are interdependent. Stability of the unit of account is central to the overall coordination
problem. This precondition together with the integration of the monetary system into the
equilibrating mechanism of the economy would form the basis for the stability of economic
processes, on his view (cf. Folz 1970).
Essentially, Eucken’s famous principle of the “primacy of currency policy” reflects
the same concerns that are at the heart of Keynes’s (1923: xiv) observation that modern
arrangements in production and finance “cannot work properly if the money, which they
assume as a stable measuring-rod, is undependable.” The difference is that Keynes went on to
argue that a “managed currency” was inevitable, whereas Eucken (1949: 91) sought after an
“automatically working monetary stabilizer” that could be implanted into the general order of
economic competition as part of sound “Ordnungspolitik.”
As far as the structure of the financial system was concerned, Eucken’s (1946a) views
on any required restructuring were radical. He generally sympathized with Irving Fisher’s
(1935) idea (or, “Chicago Plan”) of strict separation between credit business and money
creation; but disliked that this would make money-creating institutions completely dependent
upon the central bank and therefore indirectly the state. An alternative scheme, due to Hans
Gestrich (1936, 1944), which aimed at establishing a high degree of maturity matching
among different kinds of banks, with each kind engaging in both credit and money creation,
would have left the banking system more elastic too; an additional advantage in Eucken’s
view.
Of particular interest to us is an unpublished
9 report “On the nationalization of the
central bank,” in which Eucken (1946b) laid out his ideas on how the central bank might be
integrated into the system of state control. In there Eucken compared two opposing solutions.
                                                            
9 I am indebted to Walter Oswald (Walter Eucken Archiv, Frankfurt am Main) for making this report available
to me and granting me permission to quote from it.16
An example of the first extreme of an independent central bank was provided by the German
Bank Law of 1924. Despite its supposed advantage of blocking central bank financing of
budget deficits, Eucken rejected it on the following general grounds: “an all too independent
and weakly controlled central bank is difficult to fit into the structure of the state. It will be
tempted to position itself in opposition to the general economic policy of the state. A
“pluralism” will easily develop that would jeopardize the unity of state policy.” Examples for
the other extreme were provided, in his view, by the German Bank Law of 1939 as well as
contemporary tendencies toward nationalization (e.g. in England) that would integrate the
central bank into the state apparatus. While forestalling the risk of pluralism in policymaking,
this would invite inflationary risks due to free access to credit, in his view.
Eucken thus favored an interim solution. While retaining the central bank as an
autonomous institution with monopolistic privileges, the central bank is to receive its statutes
from the state and be subjected to “precisely specified state control, which would make it
impossible for it to conduct its own economic policy against the state” (my translation). He
identified the balance of power between Treasury and central bank as vitally important.
As currency arrangements may constrain both central bank and state discretion more
generally, it is noteworthy that the early Eucken (1923) favored a gold currency but in his
final years showed much sympathy for a “commodity-reserve-currency” regime along the
lines of a proposal by Benjamin Grahams (1937). In his view, such a scheme would go a long
way towards meeting his key endeavor of implanting an “automatically working monetary
stabilizer” (Eucken 1949: 91) into the economic order of competition.
Given his reservations against the Chicago Plan (“not an automatism, but the will of
these authorities regulates the money stock”; Eucken 1949: 79; my translation), one might at
first suspect an important contrast here between Eucken and Friedman’s k-percent proposal.
Yet, Friedman too did not want his favored scheme to depend on the authorities’ will (or
whim), but proposed to oblige them by law to regulate money in a precisely specified way.
The real difference is that whereas Friedman
10 denied any need for active manipulation by the
central bank in order to counterbalance instabilities in the velocity of circulation (as held by
the original proponents of the Chicago plan), Eucken saw merit in having some elasticity in
the monetary system. At a deeper level, Friedman’s thought derived from a liquidity-
                                                            
10 I should say here: the Friedman of the famous k-percent rule. Friedman’s (1948) earlier “framework” featured
a far more responsive money supply, due to a direct link to the budgetary position. Friedman’s later (1984)
refinement went all the way to k = 0 , amounting to locking up the central bank and throwing away the keys.17
preference-theoretic version of the quantity theory and relied mainly on the “Keynes (interest
rate) effect” (cf. Bibow 2000, 2002b) as equilibrating mechanism even in case of an inelastic
money stock, whereas Eucken’s more rudimentary quantity-theoretic thought stressed the
(hoped-for) extra and more direct impact on the production of the commodities that form the
bundle underlying the commodity-reserve-currency in that kind of regime. Interestingly, he
found the supposed direct link between his favored “automatically working monetary
stabilizer” and the real production sphere of the economy particularly attractive.
In any case, what these two liberals truly shared in common was the conviction that it
should not be left at the authorities’ whim to intervene in the market process. Interpreting
Eucken’s principle of “primacy of currency policy” as a call and justification for CBI is a
nonstarter. Monetary policy is not elevated to the level of “Ordnungspolitik” simply by
delegating interventions in the market process to independent central bankers. (Particularly,
as there may be more than one way of maintaining price stability, including the simple-
minded approach of inflicting protracted stagnation upon the economy.) As Friedman,
Eucken too yearned for an automatically working monetary stabilizer, since anything else
would generally ask too much from those human hands in charge: “Ignorance, weakness vis-
à-vis interest groups and public opinion, flawed theories, all this influences the leaders much
to the damage of the task they are entrusted with” (Eucken 1952: 257; my translation).
Eucken’s concerns in this regard were generally shared by, and echoed in the works
of, his pupils Friedrich A. Lutz (1935, 1936, 1949), Fritz W. Meyer (1938), and Leonhard
Miksch (1948, 1949a,b,d). While the former two favored a gold currency as a solution to the
issue, Miksch (1949b) devised a scheme that, while principally based on gold too, would also
encapsulate an elastic element based on (trade) bills of exchange designed to adjust fully
automatically. To be complemented by radical reforms in the financial system, the scheme
was intended not only to make banks safe, but also to re-establish an order in which classical
capital theory would hold, in his view. This brings out the fundamental issue most clearly: the
role of the rate of interest as equilibrating market mechanism.
Echoing Eucken (1940), Miksch deplored that in a credit money system investment
could run ahead of voluntary saving, so that the consumer-saver would be left out of the
determination of the temporary structure of the economic process. In his envisaged system,
by contrast, “capital can only be formed out of true saving. Correspondingly, the rate of
interest is a true market price for the postponement of consumption, so that the consumer has18
complete rule over the economic process” (Miksch 1949b: 155; my translation). Clearly, if
the key issue is that the consumer-saver should have complete rule over the economic process
and interest rate determination be left to the self-control of markets, allowing central bankers,
whether independent or dependent or anything else, to manipulate a non-automatic credit
money apparatus through interest rate policies can hardly qualify as sound
“Ordnungspolitik.”
The Freiburg School is widely considered to, in important ways, also include F. A.
von Hayek. The early Hayek was sympathetic to the commodity- reserve-currency idea too
(see Hayek 1942), and his pupil Vera Smith (wife of F. A. Lutz) is best known for her
critique of central banking and endorsement of free banking (see Smith 1936). But Hayek’s
later views, expressed in The Denationalisation of Money, are of particular interest. For they
best illustrate yet another monetary order that seems fully compatible with liberal thought.
Hayek ([1976] 1990) proposed that private issuers of money should be free to choose
and create their own favorite currency of denomination and, freely competing with state
issuers, might perhaps best commit to keeping their issued currency stable in terms of some
bundle of commodities (a remnant of earlier ideas). Hayek would leave it to the market to
discover not just which currencies may be sound and safe, but also what the “optimal
quantity” of money (Hayek [1976] 1990: 81) may be. Sharing Eucken’s favor for some
elasticity in money supply against Friedman’s more rigid k-percent regime (cf. Fischer 1986),
Hayek saw it as an additional advantage of his favored regime that “at the same time it would
remove the necessity of making it fully automatic by taking the control from a monopolistic
authority and entrusting it to private concerns” (48). Hayek too viewed a sound monetary
order as key to the stability of the economic process. In the currency sphere too, however, he
put his faith on competition. In his view, “the past instability of the market economy is the
consequence of the exclusion of the most important regulator of the market mechanism,
money, from itself being regulated by the market process” (102; italics in original). Making
the thrust of his argument perfectly clear, Hayek welcomed that:
With the central banks and the monopoly of the issue of money would, of course,
disappear also the possibility of deliberately determining the rate of interest. The
disappearance of what is called “interest rate policy” is wholly desirable. The rate of
interest, like any other price, ought to record the aggregate effects of thousands of
circumstances affecting the demand for and supply of loans which cannot possibly be
known to any one agency. The effects of most price changes are unpleasant to some, and,
like other price changes, changes in the rate of interest convey to all concerned that an
aggregate of circumstances which nobody knows has made them necessary. The whole19
idea that the rate of interest ought to be used as an instrument of policy is entirely
mistaken, since only competition in a free market can take account of all the circumstances
which ought to be taken account of in the determination of the rate of interest (106-7).
In conclusion, our analysis of the Freiburg School on the issue of monetary order
confirms that CBI is not at all compatible with Ordoliberalism. I see no basis for Bernholz’s
(1989: 208) assertion that “a minimal position exists, however, which would have been
accepted probably by all German neo-liberals: an independent central bank obliged by law to
preserve a stable currency.”
11 Neither making sense in terms of theory nor offering an
accurate account of history, Bernholz goes on to assert that: “It is thus not surprising that
such a minimal solution emerged in the Federal Republic of Germany after the war” (208).
From an ordoliberal viewpoint, it is key to establish a monetary order that does not
require and involve interventions in the market process. Whether Eucken’s, Hayek’s, or
Friedman’s proposed schemes might be practicable and in full compliance with their
theoretical norms is another matter. The point is: Their respective proposals clearly show that
these liberal thinkers envisioned radical reforms in order to comply with the principles which
their aspired ideal of a sound monetary order would require. Empowering some
monopolist—independent of political control!—with the right to fiddle with interest rates is
probably the last thing that would present itself as safe and sound “Ordnungspolitik,” from
their viewpoint. And one might add here that regarding Eucken’s principle of “primacy of
currency policy” as justifying an independent central bank as chief intervener in the market
process of interest rate determination would be just as fallacious, as it would be ludicrous to
seek guidance for sound interest rate policies from his principle of “constancy of economic
policy.”
6. AN ALTERNATIVE KEYNESIAN CONCEPTION OF MONETARY ORDER
THAT FELL THROUGH, TOO
Given the general disdain among Ordoliberals for any Keynesian ideas, it is perhaps
something of an irony that Milton Friedman designed an “automatically working monetary
stabilizer” that was much akin in spirit to Eucken’s aspired monetary order, but based on
Keynes’ monetary theory. Another irony is that, contrary to a widespread presumption,
ordoliberal thinking on what might represent sound “Ordnungspolitik” in the area of money,
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did not have any influence on actual developments in West Germany after WWII. The same
may be said though about Keynesian views on this matter. While this section reveals that
Keynesianism proved influential in the economics profession, including important advisory
bodies, from early on, Keynesian ideas on the issue of political control over monetary policy
had no decisive impact on actual developments either.
The proposition that “a managed currency is inevitable” (Keynes 1923) provided
Keynes’ starting point in all his monetary works. Throughout his life he considered monetary
policy as one of the key “central controls” over the economic process within a system of
“individualistic capitalism” encompassing a sophisticated financial system. The intention and
approach was not to specifically plan and intervene in the allocation of resources. Rather, at
issue was deliberate aggregate demand management, which Keynesians in general consider
both inevitable and, as general and aggregate rather than specific intervention in the market
process, “marktkonform” too (the German term here is “Globalsteuerung”).
It is less well known though that Keynes also saw an important role for CBI in all this.
When the Labor Party drew up a plan in 1932 that would have brought the Bank of England
under the direct control of a cabinet minister (himself accountable to Parliament), Keynes
objected to the plan. Stressing the need for a decentralized institutionalization of economic
control and the role of special expertise in monetary policy, Keynes argued that the activities
of a central bank consist of “the practice of a very difficult technique, of which Parliament
will understand less than nothing. A planned economy will be impracticable unless there is
the utmost decentralization in the handling of expert controls” (Keynes [1932] 1982: 131).
Confirmed in his other contributions on this issue too (see Bibow 2002a), Keynes saw
it as the government’s prerogative—under parliamentary control and within the legal limits
prescribed by it—to lay down the main lines of economic policy, while interest rate policy
should better be left to the monetary experts at the central bank. Expressed in modern
terminology, he favored a monetary structure that featured instrument independence but goal
dependence of the central bank. Within Keynes’ favored scheme, Treasury and independent
central bank would not be antagonists as in Vocke’s vision, but partners cooperating to attain
common goals as decided for them by the government of the day. Given that Eucken too
denied the central bank any right to conduct its policy in opposition to the government, Karl
Schiller ([1962] 1964), economics minister between 1966 and 1972 and a Keynesian with
great respect for Eucken too, was right to point out that the central guiding principle of unity
in economic policy (“Wirtschaftspolitik aus einem Guss”) was shared by Keynes and Eucken.21
On 18 September 1949, the scientific advisory committee of the economics ministry
published its report “Monetary order and economic control” (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim
BMW 1973), in which the committee briefly commented on the issue at hand. It advised that:
“The unity of economic and monetary order requires a timely coordination between
all authorities involved in economic policy. This also includes the central bank, since
the aspired economic order cannot be realized without a corresponding monetary
constitution and monetary policy. Within this framework of cooperation the central
bank needs to be independent to the extent that it bears responsibility for the currency.
This independence is to be protected by law” (my translation).
Unfortunately, the committee neither provided any more specific guidance on how this kind
of independence should be organized so as to secure cooperation at the same time. Nor did it
further rationalize the need for this kind of independence in the first place.
What seems most remarkable though, particularly in view of the fact that the
committee included various members of the Freiburg School
12 (or at least with ordoliberal
leanings), is that the committee accepted that the practical nature of monetary policy would
have to be of an ongoing discretionary type rather than one-off “Ordnungspolitik”:
“Whether an automatically working monetary order could be realized might be left on
one side. Under existing conditions the manipulation of the quantity of money will be
necessary in any case. It should set itself the aim of allowing the development of
production and turnover under avoidance of inflationary or deflationary processes.
This is not possible through a one-off institutional change of the current monetary
organization, but requires a very particular monetary policy on a continuous basis”
(Report of 18 September 1949, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim BMW 1973; my
translation).
It is also noteworthy that the committee considered both employment and price developments
as relevant and suggested that monetary policy has to be guided no other than by an analysis
of the whole economic situation. There is no denying that a monetary order of this kind
would grant the central bank significant discretionary powers, which is important in view of
the committee’s call for policy coordination and unity in economic policy.
As the debate on the Bundesbank Act progressed over the years, the committee was
called upon by Ludwig Erhard’s economics ministry (which by that time had taken over
responsibility for the Bundesbank Act from the finance ministry) to offer its expert opinion
on the matter, which it duly did in its “Recommendations and preliminary opinions” of
February 1954 (cf. Becker 1982). In there the committee tackled in a fairly precise way with
                                                            
12 The committee included, for instance, Walter Eucken (until his death on 20 April 1950), Franz Böhm, Adolf
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the central bank’s role and tasks and how its independence in fulfilling its job might best be
organized.
The committee rejected a return to gold or any other precise and rigid norm for the
bank. But it argued that for the purpose of coordination with economic and fiscal policies
laying down particular guidelines would be “necessary,” and that linking economic and
monetary policies would justify a “legal rule.” Proposals for such a legal rule were discussed
which would limit the central bank’s room for maneuvre without specifying its goals in more
concrete terms. The committee (now including later economics minister Karl Schiller too)
ended up recommending the following formula:
“The central bank has to orientate its monetary and credit policy in the interest of
steady growth of the economy is such a way as to keep the purchasing power of the
DM as far as possible stable, in a way that monetary and credit policy contributes to
the employment of all resources, and that the balance of payment may balance on the
basis of free international trade” (repr. in Becker 1982: 73; my translation).
The crucial point about this proposed formula for the Bundesbank Act is that the
central bank’s foreseen remit was equivalent to what the committee had in mind as
orientation for macroeconomic management in general anyway. (In fact, it was also
equivalent to what was eventually laid down in the SGA of 1967; see below.) Monetary and
economic policy generally would thus have been bound by a common rule and be geared at
common goals to be pursued in a coordinated fashion. Put the other way round, the central
bank was not supposed to be goal independent or pursue its own goals. The committee’s
primary concern was to constrain the central bank’s independence in appropriate ways to
achieve that very end. Only in so far as its exclusive responsibilities in the sphere of its
technical competence was concerned, the bank would be [instrument!] independent from any
instructions:
“In the application of its set of instruments and operations the bank is not
subordinated to any instructions from the government. In its decision on the optimal
compromise between the [aforementioned] three policy goals the bank has to take the
general economic policy of the government into account” (repr. in Becker 1982; 73-4;
my translation).
As it turned out, however, the committee’s views had no decisive influence on
subsequent developments. It was never even consulted again on the issue. One reason may
have been that it recommended a comprehensive Enquete commission for a thorough
investigation into the issue, which conflicted with the ministry’s timing plans. Another that
the committee in a somewhat controversial way also recommended conserving the system’s23
decentralized structure, which conflicted with Erhard’s own views on the matter. But the key
fact remains nonetheless: in the mid 1950s Erhard’s advisory council designed and
recommended an essentially Keynesian structure of monetary policy, which would have
altered the situation that had become established with the “Übergangsgesetz” of 1951.
7. LUDWIG ERHARD AS FIGHTER FOR THE BUNDESBANK’S
INDEPENDENCE?
As economics minister of the “Bizone” and in the context of the currency reform of 20 June
1948, Ludwig Erhard was responsible for the “Leitsätzegesetz,” which according to Kloten
(1997, 163; my translation) “was the hour when West Germany’s market economic order was
properly born.” Later, as economics minister of the Adenauer government, Erhard attained
fame as the mastermind behind the “Wirtschaftswunder” (economic miracle). It is generally
attributed to Erhard that he held ordoliberal views and was a strong proponent of CBI too.
After all, when the Bundesbank Act was finally passed in 1957 and the Bundesbank’s
independence properly enshrined in the law, this occurred under his ministry’s control.
Indeed, it is quite easy to cite Erhard in ways that would clearly seem to substantiate
his supposed credentials as proponent of CBI. For instance, when asked by Adenauer in
November 1949 to comment on a letter by Vocke, Erhard stated that he agreed with Vocke
that trust in the stability of the currency was fundamentally based on the independence of the
central bank: “As to the relationship between the Federal government and the BdL or the
CBC, I am generally of the opinion that the legal autonomy or independence of the central
bank must not be touched. This principle has always proved prosperous” (BA 136/1999; my
translation). In 1956, he then proclaimed: “The formula “dependent central bank = inflation”
holds always and everywhere” (BA 102/12595,2; my translation).
Alas, the matter is far less clear than it may at first appear from such seemingly
compelling evidence. For reading these observations in context reveals that Erhard, too, was
convinced that final responsibility and power to determine economic and monetary policy
rested with the government, especially its economics minister.
13 What he rejected was that the
government might by law be placed in a position to give instructions to the central bank. In
Erhard’s view, the government’s influence should not flow from any legal right to give direct
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instructions, but—far more opaquely—hinge upon the economics minister’s powers of
persuasion in dealing with the (government-appointed) personalities of the bank’s leaders.
It is worthwhile considering Erhard’s views on the CBI issue in relation to his
position within the government. For one thing, as long as Schäffer’s finance ministry held the
leadership role within the government vis-à-vis the central bank, strengthening the finance
minister’s grip on the bank, if anything, might have further weakened his own position;
particularly as Erhard’s position was far from secure in the early 1950s. This factor by itself
made Erhard a natural defendant of the bank’s independence. For another, even when Erhard
had gained the upper hand vis-à-vis the finance minister later on, there was still the
Chancellor’s attitude to be checked, representing another stumbling block for Erhard’s own
ambitions. It is true in this context that Erhard repeatedly warned Adenauer on the latter’s
public attacks on the BdL, which Erhard considered risky and counterproductive. Yet, Erhard
may have simply understood that if Adenauer’s ambitions for more explicit government
control over the bank were to prove successful, the power would have been grabbed by
Adenauer himself; whereas if any public conflict between Adenauer and the BdL backfired,
this would tend to weaken the government’s position as a whole, including his own.
No doubt West Germany’s very power-conscious first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer,
thoroughly objected to his lack of power over the bank. This is as clear from the early stages
of negotiations that led up to the “Übergangsgesetz” of 1951, as it is for the final stages in
1956. Essentially, he considered the arrangements foreseen in the draft law under discussion
at the time as being in contradiction to the Grundgesetz. The minutes of the cabinet meeting
of 11 July 1956 depict Adenauer’s position as follows:
“Article 3 of the draft would allocate securing the currency as an independent task to the
Bundesbank. This task, however, constituted an inalienable part of the government’s
responsibility for general economic policy. If besides the draft’s Article 3 (2) only instructs
the bank to support the government’s economic policy within the framework of securing the
currency this would concede primacy for safeguarding the currency over general economic
policy and entitle the central bank with an autonomous decision on the case of conflict. Such a
regulation would conflict with the Grundgesetz. … the Bundesbank would be the primary
authority of control, at least in the sphere of monetary policy, although it is not politically
accountable to anyone. That would concede to the central bank a position of authority within
the state, which could oppose the political authorities” (Cabinet Minutes 1956: 474-6; my
translation).
Subsequent to these discussions the relevant provisions were redrafted so as to appease
Adenauer. In particular, safeguarding the currency became a shared responsibility of both the
government and the Bundesbank, while the bank’s independence from government25
instruction was reserved a less prominent place in the act. However, just as Adenauer had
reached agreement on the matter within his cabinet, the proposed new construct and balance
of power foreseen therein met opposition in both chambers of parliament. Apart from still
pushing for conserving the (Allies-imposed) decentralized organization of the central banking
system, the Bundesrat particularly demanded that the Bundesbank’s independence should be
more explicitly emphasized. At the law’s first reading in the Bundestag the speaker for the
Social Democratic Party in opposition expressed the same desire.
Curiously, this was Walter Seuffert, who in the parliamentary discussion on the
“Übergangsgesetz” in 1951 had articulated concerns about the somewhat insecure position of
the government vis-à-vis the bank. The year 1957, when the Bundesbank Act was finally
passed, was also a year when federal elections were held. In May of the year before,
Adenauer’s public attack on the BdL’s rate hikes (famously known as the “Gürzenich affair”)
provoked solidarity with the guardian of the currency from all round. Thus, hardly
unwelcome to the central bankers, at the final stage of hammering out its legal status the
bank’s position was bolstered by public opinion. In the end, the government’s responsibility
for safeguarding the currency was dropped again by the mediation committee of the two
chambers of parliament (arguing that this would go without saying), while the Länder
managed to retain their overweight position as far as appointment of the bank’s leadership
was concerned.
One could hardly go wrong in concluding that Adenauer’s ambitions had failed, if not
backfired: the Länder and the left-wing opposition felt compelled to protect the bank’s
independence against the Chancellor’s grip. As a result, the preliminary construct of 1951
was essentially retained in the final law, except for its even more explicit emphasis on the
bank’s independence and some federal government say in the appointment process of its
leadership. This legalized a role for the central bank which Adenauer had not only feared, but
considered in conflict with the Grundgesetz too: a public authority of executive powers that
could oppose the government at its own discretion but without accountability to anyone.
As Erhard was probably aware of Adenauer’s impact on public opinion and on the
balance of power between the government and the bank, he avoided public confrontations
with its leaders. Preferring more opaque channels of influence, it is of great interest that
Erhard insisted in 1954, when West Germany joined the IMF and the relationship between
the BdL and the government as regards exchange rate matters (a matter in the economics26
ministry’s sphere of responsibilities) had to be settled, that the government must reserve the
final word for itself  (cf. Cabinet Minutes 1954: 43-4, 16
th meeting on 29 January 1954).
Exchange rate issues turned out to be the bone of contention between the government
and the bank on many a subsequent occasion. Enjoying some degree of freedom in the 1950s
even within the Bretton Woods regime, capital flows became an increasingly important factor
in monetary policy with the full convertibility of the D-Mark since late December 1958. In
1961, in applying his powers of persuasion on the personalities ruling at the bank, Erhard
expressed another brisk formula on the CBI issue that is of some interest here. He declared
that “independence of the Bundesbank presupposes that a common line will be found.”
14
Succeeding Adenauer as Chancellor in 1963, Erhard’s fall as such in 1966 is viewed by some
as having been linked to the Bundesbank’s highly esteemed president Karl Blessing in
particular (Caesar 1981, Holtfrerich 1988, 1998). (Some believe he may not have been the
only German Chancellor struck by the same destiny; Marsh 1992.) Deliberately engineered
by the Bundesbank (Girsch et al 1992: 144-5), West Germany’s first recession (since the
crisis of 1950-1) in 1966-7 also marked the beginning of the Keynesian era of
“Globalsteuerung.”
8. KARL SCHILLER AND THE STABILITY AND GROWTH ACT OF 1967:
BELATED KEYNESIAN TRIUMPH?
The crucial cause for conflict immanent in both the “Übergangsgesetz” of 1951 and the
Bundesbank Act of 1957 may be pinpointed here. The particular form of independence
established in there, by defining the central bank’s goals and its duties to cooperate with the
government in vague terms only, endows the bank with a huge degree of discretion. This may
quite easily provoke tensions with the government which, inevitably, bears ultimate
responsibility for economic and monetary policy. In fact, the flaw in this monetary structure
is that it risks setting the incentives and interests of the two players on collision course.
The government might tend to lose its own political interest in maintaining price
stability, if success at that front only benefits the central bank’s prestige anyway; while, at the
same time, being forced to push its policies in other directions by at least as much as its
prestigious antagonist might allow at any time. Matters are made worse should the central
                                                            
14 Minutes of CBC Meeting of 30 May 1961, p. 13, Buba HA B 330/178, (cf. Berger 1997: 201). My translation.27
bank succeed in defining its own public prestige in terms of price stability only. For this
might encourage complete denial of any adverse effect on other policy goals due to “its own
success” with respect to “its own primary goal.” In line with Wilhelm Vockes’ vision,
government and bank are positioned as antagonists rather than partners in the pursuance of
common goals.
Given that the Bundesbank Act left the substance of the bank’s independence
essentially undefined, the actual relationship and balance of power between the government
and the central bank within the state was thereby left to be determined in the course of action
—a game to be played though within this particular set-up. As the outcome would depend
upon public perceptions, it was in the central bank’s institutional self-interest to act even
more as a political player in its own right in order to woo public opinion; even if this came at
the government’s expense. Particularly, as its power and independence was only protected by
simple law, which, in principle, could have been easily changed by parliament at any time.
15
Other researchers noted the bank’s efforts in this regard. “The Bundesbank has always
tried to influence public opinion,” Berger and de Haan (1999, 17) observed, for instance. Its
head start in the newly founded West German state and its early gained prestige formed the
bank’s capital against competitors in the political arena: “Far more important .. was the social
support for the principle of central bank independence. In the BdL’s first ten years, its
success in maintaining price stability had won substantial praise from a society enjoying the
benefits of economic success. This popular support … proved critical in limiting the
government’s influence over the structure and, hence, the future policies of the central bank”
(Goodman 1992: 40). In fact, some Bundesbank leaders were quite open about the objectives
and successes of the bank’s public relation efforts:
“From the beginning the German central bank undertook great efforts on her own to
foster the public’s understanding and support for stability-oriented policy. This was at
the same time necessary to put the independence of the central bank on a firm basis.
… [I agreed with Eduard Wolf] that the independence of the Bundesbank would only
be secured if it was supported by approval from the vast majority of the population;
only then would it be protected against attacks from the political side. Furthermore
we said: If the Bundesbank is neither accountable to the government nor parliament,
in a democracy it then has to render public account to the people. So we decided to
advertise for the appreciation and support of the central bank by means of busy
publication activity” (Emminger 1986, 26-7; own translation).
                                                            
15 According to Stern (1992) it was only with the German Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992 that the Bundesbank’s independence became constitutionally guaranteed.28
This kind of advertisement for its own position not only represents a dubious form of public
accountability. It may be particularly prone to drive a wedge between the government and the
central bank, and thus risk undermining the unity in economic policymaking, which Walter
Eucken held was the overriding principle in any sound economic order.
Caesar’s (1981, p. 202) observation that “public discussion in Germany perfectly
taboos the principle of CBI” (my translation) is thus of great interest. Public confrontation
between Chancellor Adenauer and the BdL in 1956 proved as conducive to mobilizing public
support for the bank’s independence in the final stages of negotiating the Bundesbank Act of
1957, as they had done earlier in the context of the “Übergangsgesetz.”
16 In the parliamentary
debates on the Stability and Growth Act [SGA] of 1967 economics minister Karl Schiller
considered it necessary to repeatedly emphasize that the Bundesbank Act was untouchable.
Karl Schiller and the SGA are widely seen as marking the (belated) triumph of
Keynesianism in German economic policymaking (Abelshauser 1991). While following
Eucken in generally rejecting government (micro) interventions in specific market processes,
Schiller (1966) held that macroeconomic demand management (“Globalsteuerung”) aimed at
stabilizing aggregate economic activity was equally necessary to safeguard the market
economy. The SGA legally declared the very set of goals that featured in Erhard’s Advisory
Council’s deliberations of the mid 1950s to be the key goals of general economic policy.
Since the Bundesbank’s independence was untouchable, however, the brief phase of
Keynesianism in Germany, which allegedly began in 1967, did not include monetary policy.
Note that Milton Friedman gave his famous presidential address to the American
Economics Association in 1967 too, widely seen as marking the beginning of the triumph of
monetarism. Some years earlier Friedman had declared that:
“The central problem is not to construct a highly sensitive instrument that can
continuously offset instability introduced by other factors, but rather to prevent
monetary arrangements from themselves becoming a primary source of instability.
What we need is not a skilled monetary driver of the economic vehicle continuously
turning the steering wheel to adjust to the unexpected irregularities of the route, but
some means of keeping the monetary passenger who is in the back seat as ballast
from occasionally leaning over and giving the steering wheel a jerk that threatens to
send the car off the road” (Friedman 1960, 23).
Whether Keynesianism enjoyed any real triumph in Germany in 1967 may be just as
debatable as the idea of monetarism’s triumph in the practical affairs of central banking. It
seems as if Friedman’s views on what might constitute a sound monetary order were
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similarly ignored as those of Eucken: central bankers have become ever more firmly and
cosily seated behind the economy’s steering wheel. All around the world central banks
continuously interfere in market processes by conducting, however guided, interest rate
policies. In one way or another, they are part of the political process of modern democracies
too. Some forms of independence may be observed that even seem to grant the central bank a
legal right to oppose any democratically elected government at their discretion.
In Germany, Karl Schiller’s fall as “super-minister” in 1972, too, (when he, unusually,
headed both the finance and the economics ministries) occurred in the context of his public
confrontation with the Bundesbank. Katzenstein (1987, p. 97) vigilantly observed that the
bank might have had an interest “in eliminating a personal rival who appeared in the process
of building a countervailing institutional power base.” Yet, if the guardian of the currency is
generally held to cause no harm whatever in pursuing its own primary goal of price stability,
any critic of the bank will automatically be seen as an attacker on the public good of a sound
currency. In fact, in explaining its conduct solely in terms of its commitment to price stability
few might suspect that the bank’s self-interest, foremost in protecting its own independence
and power, might ever play any role at all. Germany’s post-war monetary history provides an
illuminating case study of the evolution of central banking institutions and traditions within
the realm of an intricate political power struggle. As far as the role of economics is
concerned, the peculiar German tradition of an early emphasis on CBI paired with stability-
orientation in policy does not seem to have any firm basis in contemporary German monetary
thought. Historical accidents and the peculiar personalities involved, especially their abilities
to mould public perceptions in line with their interests, appear to have been more important.
9. CONCLUSION
Allied decentralization policy had a lasting impact on the federal structure of West
Germany’s central banking system. As far as the country’s famous CBI tradition is
concerned, however, that was of peculiarly German origin and design. The tradition started
with the interim law of 1951, then became fully legally confirmed in the Bundesbank Act of
1957, and has not been touched ever since. This contrasted with the initial status of the
central bank as one of all-comprehensive dependence upon Allied control, exercised through
the ABC.30
The point is that at the time of the BdL’s establishment, the bank could hardly have
been made dependent upon German control, as no federal government existed yet. It also
meant that the BdL was blessed with a head start and from early on busy, engaged in building
up its own reputation. Its position was further strengthened by the fact that when the first
federal government entered the play, the newcomer also had to deal with the vested interests
of the Länder. While the Allies’ policy of federalization thus influenced the outcome of the
bank’s independence after all, albeit indirectly, it can also be said that the bank played its
cards rather well. As the body politic got quickly caught up in power fights among itself, it is
curious that the bank seemed to emerge ever more powerful from public conflicts with its
political master—its independence gaining the “untouchable” status in due course.
Most surprisingly, perhaps, the analysis shows that considering Ordoliberalism as the
source of inspiration and theoretic basis of this peculiarly German tradition of CBI has no
basis. The Freiburg School is generally held to have been a decisive influence in shaping
West Germany’s economic order and its “miraculous” performance. Yet, the postulate of CBI
stands in stark conflict with anything Walter Eucken and his pupils had to say on what might
constitute a sound monetary order. For delegating interest rate policy to independent central
bankers does not transform regular interventions in the market process into
“Ordnungspolitik.”
Contrary to another widely held view, Keynesian ideas too left their mark on
Germany’s economics profession from early on. In this regard it is of particular interest that,
in the mid 1950s, Erhard’s Advisory Council designed and recommended a model of CBI
that was essentially Keynesian in spirit. The council specified that the bank should be
instrument independent, but otherwise focused its efforts on constraining the bank’s
discretion and securing cooperation with the government. Failing to make an impression at
the time, the “legal rule” proposed for the set of goals to be pursued by the government and
central bank in cooperation later on made its way into the Keynesian SGA of 1967. By that
time, though, the Bundesbank Act and the bank’s independence had attained a status of being
“untouchable.”
Contemporary economic theory thus had no decisive influence on Germany’s peculiar
CBI tradition paired with a so-called stability-orientation in monetary policy. Arguably, this
tradition may be in conflict with principles of democracy as well as market-theoretic
considerations; an issue on which a fair amount of agreement between Keynesian and
ordoliberal (as well as monetarist) thought is discernible. Perhaps the central bank’s role as a31
political actor in its own right and in carving public opinion should not be underestimated in
explaining a peculiar German tradition that was finally exported to Europe in the 1990s.
One important issue—and task for future research—is to investigate whether and to
what extent Germany’s peculiar monetary traditions may have proved conducive to
Germany’s economic performance in the past, as conventional wisdom has it, which
conditioning factors might have played an important role in producing the historical record,
and whether some peculiar setting might be easily replicable at the European level. Another
issue is to realize that a central bank’s public relation efforts, apart from its primary goal of
wooing the general public, may also have secondary targets in focus, like the economics
profession itself, for instance. On this link Peter Johnson vigilantly observed:
“Indeed, perhaps even more than the German state itself, the principal beneficiary of
its efficient mobilization of expertise was the prestige of the Bundesbank. While
American monetarists failed to alter the independence of the Fed, the Bundesbank
converted the next generation of economists to the cause of independent central
banks, albeit with a foreshortening of political vision that comes from over
emphasizing independence as the crucial factor for success. This legacy in enhancing
the prestige of independent central banks among economists on opposite sides of the
ocean illustrates the powerful influence that epistemic politics can have on
researchers themselves. It would be naive to suppose that the greater success and
durability achieved by monetarism (especially in the Bundesbank) has not also had an
impact on analysts of comparative public policy” (P. A. Johnson 1998: 18).32
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